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ASP Performance Assessment: toward a science-based 
understanding
Several approaches to ASP performance can be contemplated.  Perhaps the ideal 
would be a full cost/benefit analysis (which is probably utterly infeasible).  Another 
approach would be a test-based figure-of-merit (FOM), this approach has the virtue of 
being quantitative and the challenge that each customer and application would be 
characterized by a different FOM.  The alternative proposed here is an approach that uses 
information about the limits of detection of real instruments to support informed 
judgments.
An ideal calculation of the benefit
An ideal performance FOM would take into account, in detail, all the benefits a 
customer could expect to reap from the use of a system.  Here benefit is defined as 
accomplishing the goal of interdicting a threat with a limited impact on commerce.  This 
would mean including, for example, the entire catalog of threat objects that might be 
encountered along with the expected benefit (cost of failure-to-detect avoided) and the 
rate of attempts to deliver each object.  The information for such a complete assessment 
will probably never be available.  Nevertheless, formulating the approach may help guide 
a practical approach.
The expected cost of a failure to detect an item labeled i is Ci.  The expected 
delivery attempt rate (attempts per year to deliver an object of type i per ASP at a 
location where ASP units are operating) is Ri.  For a detection probability of Pi at each 
(assumed identical for convenience) ASP the benefit of the ASP would be
iR iC iP
i
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The benefit of an entire system can be expressed in an analogous way by taking an 
appropriate sum over system components.  It should be noted that the values of Ri are not 
constants of nature, they will vary over time and will depend on perceptions of the 
deployed interdiction system. Some have argued that as soon as Pi becomes significant 
(or is perceived to be so) Ri will drop drastically as the ASP-protected entry paths are 
effectively sealed off.
Note that only the detection probability Pi is susceptible to a purely technical 
assessment, and that even that assessment is non-trivial.  At the present time there is no 
consensus on the costs due to the successful delivery of an object or estimate of the 
delivery attempt rate for any object. The conceptually straight-forward analysis outlined 
above does not take into account important considerations including the deterrent effect 
of a system (lowering the Ri values).
The object detection probability (Pi) can be assessed (for some given ASP 
hardware and algorithm and concept of operations at a specific time and place) by 
statistically sampling the spectrum data (incorporating the effects of shielding, masking 
and background) and running the system data analysis algorithm.  There is no rigorous, 
simple method of estimating the detection probability for a spectroscopic system using a 
sophisticated algorithm as there is for gross counting systems. 
So much for a description of how performance ought to be calculated, consider 
now what can actually be done to assess performance. 
A feasible approach to informing decisions
A practical approach to understanding the benefits of a system is to undertake 
well designed sets of tests on that system.  The testing can involve measured data, 
synthetic data and combinations of the two.  
For any kind of controlled test the results must somehow reflect a realistic 
concept of operations and help decision makers understand the trade-offs available 
among systems.  One approach to doing this is to conduct tests that highlight how well 
the systems disentangle the physics of the problem. This approach would include 
considerations of how well interferences (NORM or masking) are disentangled, the ratio 
of net peak area to continuum or background (signal to noise), how well the effect of 
shielding can be teased out of the data etc.  A fundamental physics- and information-
based approach to performance can be used to understand the ultimate performance of a 
system and can transcend the details of a current algorithm that will be superseded in 
subsequent turns of spiral development.
Testing should include:
1) Test configurations that pose a sufficiently challenging detection problem to 
provide confidence that successful identification/discrimination in testing will 
indicate reliable performance in the field1
2) Tests of how well the system can disentangle threat spectrum features when  
(intentional, devious) masking sources are present
3) Tests of how well the system can disentangle threat spectrum features from 
strong (large, high activity) NORM sources
4) Tests of how well the system can extract dependable activity/mass estimates 
when the threat is highly shielded or shielded and masked
5) Tests of how well the system reports the higher energy part of the spectrum 
(beyond 3 MeV) which can be used to determine the presence of a neutron 
source, including an a-n source
6) Tests of how stringent a limit the system can place on the maximum activity 
of some isotope that might be there
7) Tests of how reliably the system can determine the presence of NORM only 
(no threat)
A substantial part of these fundamental performance characteristics can be reasonably 
well summed up in terms of signal to noise: how well does a spectral peak show up above 
the background and continuum.  An understanding of this aspect of a system can be used 
to understand (in part) the potential performance of a system independent of the details of 
the analysis algorithm.
  
1 Adapted from “Evaluation methodologies for active interrogation systems to detect well 
shielded SNM”, D. Slaughter, LLNL UCRL-TR-233693
Features of the data analysis algorithm that should be tested include:
1) Does the algorithm behave well on data from an entirely new/unexpected 
source?  I.e. does it present an error/unknown indication or a wrong 
indication.
2) How well does the algorithm cope with changing backgrounds and with the 
background depression that can be caused by an object entering the field of 
view?
The features outlined above can be investigated by ensuring that the test configurations 
include:
· Moderately strong sources behind thick, low-Z shielding.  This type of 
configuration will provide a large continuum in the spectrum.  This is the 
type of configuration that will easily set off a PVT system and may 
challange an isotope identification instrument.
· Intentionally chosen masking sources with and without the corresponding 
threat items. For example 108mAg and 177mLu have peaks that are close (at 
low energy resolution) to features in a Pu spectrum and could be 
incorporated into a tough masking configuration.  Other combinations of 
isotopes can provide peaks close to other features in SNM signatures.  The 
task of designing a set of tough cases is straight forward in concept, 
though it is not trivial to develop a set that can meet the constraints of 
reasonable cost, half-life and availability.
Good system performance against the tough configurations will provide confidence in 
field performance.  The feedback from such testing can also provide valuable input for 
further research and development in support of improvements in future spirals.
A proposed method for designing physics-based testing
1) Select a few threat sources
2) Select masking sources that are 
a. Not threats
b. Occur with some frequency in the wild
c. Have features (lines, escape peaks, Compton edges etc.) that are close 
to peaks in the spectrum from the threat.  The exact criteria for “close” 
depend on the detector technology
d. Have manageable activities
3) Design shielding (possibly separate for threat and masking sources) to
a. Maximize the challenge provided by masking
b. Add up to a “reasonable” package (with respect to total weight, size, 
activity etc.)
4) Provide enough measurement time to get high statistics data that can be down-
sampled to simulate real-time portal passages in post-measurement algorithm 
exercises.
The core design tasks (2 and 3 above) can be accomplished based on the existing 
experience base of analysts and simulations to tune up the test configurations.
Executing these steps would provide an informative data set that would enable an 
understanding of system performance and trade offs.
An example of a tough case is illustrated in Fig. 1.  This shows a (NaI detector) Pu 
spectrum along with a spectrum from a combination of two isotopes that are available 
commercially.  The similarity of the spectra gives rise to the challenge.
Figure 1 NaI(Tl) spectra (counts vs. energy in keV) of Pu and a two-component 
masking source.  Poisson sampling noise is included.
Appendix A
The value of resolution
Simple statistical considerations indicate that the required counting time to 
establish a fixed statistical confidence for a single peak is linear with detector energy 
resolution: t=q(bDE+k) 2.  Thus the detector resolution directly translates to isotope 
identification time: longer times for worse resolution (larger DE).  The values of the 
constants q, b and k are dependant on the details of the system and environment.  The 
required time-resolution relationship is illustrated in Fig A1. Alternatively the signal to 
noise ratio can be used as one figure of merit for a system.  Under the assumption of 
  
2 Detector Resolution Study, Karl Einar Nelson, LLNL, UCRL-PRES-227478
homogeneous cargo and ignoring the energy dependence of detector efficiency the signal 
to noise ratio can be written as3
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where f is the resolving power (1/DE, large values of f correspond to high resolution) of 
the detector system, t is the counting time, m the linear attenuation coefficient of the 
cargo, l the length through the cargo between the source and detector, R the distance from 
the source to the detector, A the area of the detector and b the background spectrum 
density (counts per second per keV).  The form of the expression for signal to noise 
indicates that detector resolving power, detector area and counting time contribute in 
equal proportions to detection.
Information content
A measure of the usefulness of a system is the information content of a spectrum 
(roughly, the number if independent parameters that can be extracted).  Realistic values 
for a range of detector resolutions are listed in Table A1and shown in Fig A1.  The data 
for the table and figure are from Ref [2]
Resolution (FWHM) Information content 
(theoretical max)
Information content 
(practical max)
0.25% >2100 287
0.5% 1219 267
1% 645 219
2% 330 161
4% 169 62
8% 86
Table A1. Theoretical and practical upper limits of spectrum information content as 
functions of detector resolution.
  
3 Adapted from Appendix 10 of “Independent Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Final 
Report” of Feb. 20, 2008
Figure A 1 Effect of detector resolution on required counting time
Figure A 2.  Practical information content of a spectrum vs. detector system energy 
resolution.  The four resolution bands (left to right) correspond to NaI(Tl), LaBr, 
CZT and HPGe.
Illustration of practical consequences
A key attribute of an ASP system is the probability of misidentification, declaring 
harmless material to be SNM, or declaring SNM to be non-threatening.  In Table A2 
ideal probability of misidentification is shown for several source/shielding configurations 
versus detector resolution.  
Source/Shield 0.025% 0.05% 1% 2% 4% 8%
192Ir 10mCi Z=5, 
rr=50 g/cm2
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.009
133Ba 10mCi 
Z=10, rr=30 
g/cm2
<0.0001 <0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.005 0.4
131I 10mCi 
Z=10, rr=30 
g/cm2
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.02 0.3
67Ga 10mCi 
Z=10, rr=30 
g/cm2
<0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.02 0.02 0.1
1kg WG Pu 
10mCi Z=25, 
rr=50 g/cm2
<0.0001 <0.0001 0.0003 0.04 0.3 0.4
237Np 1g Z=10, 
rr=20 g/cm2
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.001 0.2 0.4
Table A 1. Idealistic misidentification probability of nuisance and threat sources as 
a function of detector resolution.  Each spectrum had 1000 counts in it.  Nuisance 
sources were chosen based on currently most common false alarms.  Data are from 
ref. [2].
Appendix B
Ingredients for challenging cases
1. Shielding materials (various Z and thickness) for each source
2. Isotope sources that match SNM features and are reasonably available 
and have reasonable half-lives.  The sources will generally have 
activities in the range of mCi
3. A set of specific threat item surrogates to imitate or mask.
Given these ingredients informative, tough test cases can be assembled.  The ASP outputs 
from these tests can be used to inform further decisions on R&D or procurements.
